Abstract: A structural econometric model of vertical relationships is adopted to identify pricing behavior in the supply chain for fluid milk in the United States. The model consists of a system of equations that allows estimation of oligopoly power of dairy co-operatives and downstream firms, exploiting Federal Milk Marketing Order regulations to identify co-operatives' marginal cost. A key finding is that co-operatives use their market power to raise the farm price of milk by almost 9% above marginal cost, resulting in an income transfer of more than $600 million per year in markets regulated by Federal Milk Marketing Orders.
Federal regulations are the basis for prominent institutional features of U.S. dairy markets, with potentially important implications for market performance. The 1922 Capper-Volstead partially exempts U.S. farm co-operatives from antitrust laws, allowing farms to coordinate on milk marketing and input purchases. The 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and similar state legislation established milk marketing orders that regulate farm milk prices.
The stated goals of each of these policies include higher milk prices for dairy farmers. We investigate the extent to which co-operatives and marketing order regulations raise farm prices of milk through accrued market power of farmer co-operatives.
We address two important questions: How much market power accrues to dairy co-operatives?
And what are the welfare implications of market power in U.S. milk markets? Economists have paid relatively little attention to these fundamental questions that are central to the functioning of government regulations in contemporary dairy markets. The objective of this study is to fill this void by applying modern industrial-organization concepts and econometric methods in order to shed light on economic consequences of market structure in the U.S. milk markets.
While empirical studies of market power in agricultural markets are common, relatively few have addressed market power of co-operatives and even fewer have considered dairy cooperatives. Masson and Eisenstat (1980) infer that co-operatives have market power based on observations on premia extracted by co-operatives from milk processors. They conclude that such market power generated an income transfer from processors to co-operatives and a social cost of $70 million per year in the 1970s. But Masson and Eisenstat (1980) neither estimate nor test for market power. Madhavan, Masson, and Lesser (1994) regressed premia on the market share of a large dairy co-operative operating across multiple regions in the 1970s and found that the premia increased with co-operative market share, and that premia fell after the Department of Justice ordered the co-operative to cease certain practices. But this approach suffers from well-known shortcomings, among them difficulty in measuring costs and endogeneity of the market share (Perloff, Karp, and Golan, 2007, pp.31-34) . Moreover, both of these papers assume processors and retailers are price-takers. This assumption is tenuous in the current environment where milk processors and grocery retailers are concentrated, and we show that market power exercised by downstream firm affects market power by co-operatives.
In a more recent study Prasertsri and Kilmer (2008) recognize the potential for processors to exercise market power, and model a bargaining game between co-operatives and buyers. They use a Nash bargaining model to derive and estimate the relative bargaining power of dairy co-operatives and milk processors in Florida from 1998 to 2004, and find that co-operatives have greater bargaining power than processors. The authors concluded that the ability of cooperatives to sell milk to other markets combined with transactions costs incurred by processors for milk brought in from out-of-state are major factors contributing to the relative bargaining strength enjoyed by co-operatives. But the paper fails to take into account the effect of milk marketing orders on processors' market power. We show that under regulated minimum prices processors' marginal expenditure is constant and cannot be reduced further through reduced purchases; that is, marketing orders preclude oligopsony pricing by processors. No such price regulations affect output prices of processors and retailers. Thus, we believe sequential oligopoly is the relevant model of behavior.
In this article we employ an extension of the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach pioneered by Appelbaum (1979 Appelbaum ( , 1982 , Bresnehan (1982) and Lau (1982) to estimate market power of dairy co-operatives. We advance the literature by modeling and estimating imperfect competition at multiple stages of the supply chain in fluid milk markets. We adopt an econometric model of vertical relationship between co-operatives and processors-retailers to evaluate the degree of market power and its economic implications. Our econometric model exploits institutional features of Federal Milk Marketing Order regulations in order to identify market power.
The NEIO techniques have been widely applied to analyze competition in food processing and marketing (e.g., Azzam, 1997; Sexton and Lavoie, 2001; Bresnehan 1989) . The approach allows us to estimate mark-ups above marginal cost and the nature of competition in fluid milk markets. We adopt an extension of the model that allows for sequential vertical-pricing games between upstream and downstream firms (Raper et. al., 2000; Villas-Boas and Hellerstein, 2006) .
Industry Background
Contemporary dairy markets have been shaped by a complex menu of government policies as well as dramatic changes in technological and economic conditions. U.S. dairy policy has included milk marketing orders, price supports, deficiency payments, export subsidies, and import restrictions. Milk marketing orders are the centerpiece of U.S. dairy policy, and are particularly relevant to the current study. Marketing orders have three key effects (Cox and Chavas, 2001 ):
• Price discrimination Minimum processor prices are set such that fluid milk plants pay a higher price for farm milk than do other types of dairy processors;
• Revenue pooling The regulated farm price is an average of minimum prices in various uses, eliminating incentive for farmers to compete for the high-value fluid market;
• Regionalization Marketing orders use restrictions on cross-region milk shipments to maintain regional differences in minimum prices and prices received by farmers.
While details of milk marketing order regulations have evolved over time, these key elements of marketing orders have remained intact.
Meanwhile, the structure of the U.S. dairy industry has changed dramatically. Dairy farms have become larger, more specialized, and more productive. Also, under the protection of the Capper-Volstead Act, dairy co-operatives have evolved to hold dominant positions in the marketing of raw milk and the manufacture of some dairy products, including butter and milk powder. In 2002, co-operatives marketed 83 percent of all farm milk in the United States. In the same year, co-operatives produced 40 percent of the cheese, 71 percent of the butter, and 85 percent of the milk powder produced in the U.S. (USDA, 2005) . Dairy co-operatives are also important suppliers of milk to fluid milk plants, and extract premia above the marketing order minimum prices.
The fluid milk processing and food retailing sectors are also marked by concentration (USDA Economic Research Service, 2010) . From 1997 to 2002 the national four-firm concentration ratio for fluid milk plants grew faster than any other food processing sector, and many cities are currently supplied by relatively few fluid milk plants (e.g., Prasertsri and Kilmer, 2008) .
National concentration in grocery retailing also has grown over time, with four-firm concentrations ratios near unity in many locations. Concentration in milk processing and grocery retailing raise potential for noncompetitive behavior in these industries.
However marketing order regulations limit noncompetitive pricing by processors. The minimum price for milk used in fluid products (i.e., Class 1 milk) truncates the farm supply curve at the regulated minimum price, so that fluid processors' marginal expenditure is constant over the relevant range of production. While concentration may afford fluid processors market power in their output market, milk marketing order regulation makes processors price-takers in the market for their primary input
1 . Thus we model the market for fluid milk as a successive oligopoly.
The Model
We adopt Villas-Boas and Hellerstein's (2006) model of successive oligopoly. We model a twostage industry where dairy farms and co-operatives sell milk to a combined processing-retailing sector which manufactures fluid milk for sale to final consumers. 2 The model allows both dairy co-operatives and processors to potentially exercise market power in their respective output markets, but processors are assumed to be price-takers in their input market.
The inverse demand facing downstream firms, i.e., processor-retailers, is specified as
where P d is output price,Z is a vector of demand shifters and Q d is the quantity. Assuming fixed proportions we set downstream (retail) and upstream (farm) quantities equal,
Next, define marginal costs of firms as 
The system is completed by deriving the pricing equation for upstream firms (i.e., co-operatives).
From equation 2 the inverse derived demand is given by
Setting P M R u equal to C u gives the upstream firms' pricing equation:
To motivate our empirical work, it is convenient to rewrite both pricing equations in terms of elasticities. Equation 2 can be rewritten as
where
is the price elasticity of retail demand and the term (1 +
is the price elasticity of derived demand and the term (1 +
is the upstream firms' mark-up.
Equations 4 and 5 are the standard expressions of the oligopoly pricing equations estimated in the NEIO literature. These expressions have implications for estimates of the conduct parameters, λ u and λ d , which, to our knowledge, have not been discussed in the literature. For prices to be defined the conduct parameter must be less than the absolute value of the relevant price-elasticity of demand: in our case,
of demand is -0.2 (a typical finding for retail milk demand in the United States), then the conduct parameter must be less than 0.2.
Also, note that the elasticity of derived demand in equation 4 can be expressed as
Equation 6 The system comprising equations 1, 4, and 5 can be estimated simultaneously to obtain the direct estimates of the mark-ups and the elasticity of primary demand. Estimates of the conjectural elasticities and the elasticity of derived demand can then be obtained indirectly.
However, any specification errors in estimating primary demand can significantly effect the indirect estimate of the derived demand elasticity. Furthermore, a limitation of the Cournot model of a vertical relationship in the supply chain is that it does not allow different definitions of market boundaries for each stage of production. We chose the market boundary that best fits our objective of estimating co-operatives market power, which is determined by FMMO regions. Although FMMO regions represent an appropriate market boundary to measure the oligopoly power of dairy co-operatives, these market boundaries can be too large to estimate retailer's oligopoly market power. Therefore, we also estimate an alternative model in which we directly estimate derived demand together with equation 5, specifying derived demand as
The empirical model
We apply the model to each of i = 1, ..., N regional markets observed in each of t = 1, ..., T periods. Our regions correspond to the geographic areas defined by milk marketing orders. The retail demand for fluid milk is specified as
where Q is per capita quantity, R is a regional dummy, and Z is matrix of demand shifters which includes prices of related goods, per capita income, and demographics. The regional dummies allow demand to differ across regions. To evaluate sensitivity of the estimates to functional form we also estimate a log-linear version of the primary-demand equation.
The empirical analog to equation 4, the downstream pricing equation, is given as
where the USDA's Marketing Bill, M B, is included as a proxy for processor-retailers' marginal non-milk cost of production. Although we estimate a single mark-up,
all geographic markets, differences in demand allow for different conduct parameters across markets.
To specify the upstream pricing equation we consider the role of regulated minimum prices set by milk marketing orders. In a competitive, regulated equilibrium (i.e., co-operatives do not possess oligopsony power), the regulated minimum price for Class 1 milk is the equilibrium price, such that P u = min. That is, P min is co-operatives' marginal cost of supplying milk to processors (c u (V ) in equation 5). This has important implications for modeling. First, processors' marginal expenditure is constant at P min , so that the regulated minimum price eliminates the ability of processors to reduce the farm price of milk by reducing quantity purchased. At the same time, co-operatives' oligopoly power can be measured by their ability to raise prices above the regulated minimum price. The estimated co-operatives' pricing equation is specified as
The co-operative mark-up ζ = (1 + λ u η u ) −1 reflects co-operatives' ability to raise the farm price of fluid milk above the minimum Class 1 price. Thus we interpret the co-operative conduct parameter λ u in this instance as an indicator of co-operatives' market power in fluid milk markets given milk marketing order regulation.
Alternatively, we also estimate the upstream pricing equation, equation 10, together with a direct expression of derived demand
As in the three-equation model, we also estimate a log-linear version of the derived-demand equation to evaluate sensitivity of the estimates to functional form.
Estimation
Typically the econometric problem of NEIO models is a simultaneous-equation model (SEM) in which demand and supply equations are estimated together with pricing equations. To obtain direct estimates of conjectural elasticities researchers usually employ a computationally demanding nonlinear SEM estimator (e.g., Raper et al., 2000; Merel, 2009) . However, in our study we exploit FMMO price policy to derive an estimable version of the NEIO model that is linear in mark-ups. As discussed in the Model section, the minimum prices enforced by FMMOs allow us to identify co-operatives' mark-up by setting c u (V) = P min . The derived system comprising equations 8, 9, and 10 is then linear in parameters and can be estimated simultaneously to obtain estimates of mark-ups and retail demand elasticity. We combine these estimates with mark-up formulas and equation 6 to obtain indirect estimates of the elasticity of derived demand and conjectural elasticities for each market.
We use Bayesian methods to estimate both the three-equation and the two-equation models.
For notational convenience, we write the M = {2, 3} equation model compactly as
where y j is a N T -dimensional vector of observations on dependent variable, X j is a N T × K j matrix of K j explanatory variables, e j is a N T -dimensional disturbance vector, and ψ j is a denotes the standard indicator function and S denotes the feasible region of the parameters to accommodate inequality restrictions, such that: I S (ψ) = 1 if ψ ∈ S (0 otherwise). We impose restrictions from economic theory: that the own-price elasticity of demand is negative; that mark-ups are not less than unity; and that conjectural elasticities are within the unit interval.
Because the conjectural elasticities are not estimated directly we impose the restrictions through an acceptance sampling algorithm.
Using Bayes' Theorem the joint posterior of the parameters p(ψ, H|y) is proportional to the product of the likelihood function, p(y|ψ, H), and the joint prior distribution of the parameters:
The complete conditional distributions of ψ and H used to construct a Gibbs sampler are given by
where • Initialize the sample with starting values for ψ and H. In our application we set ψ = 0.
Then, to generate a starting value for H we draw 2000 Gibbs samples and used the average of last 500 draws of H as its starting value 5 .
• Draw each of ψ j |ψ −j , H, y individually from its univariate truncated normal posterior.
• Check if market power parameters are within the unit interval. If so proceed to the next step. If not redraw ψ j |ψ −j , H, y.
• Draw H using equation 13.
• Repeat all steps until satisfied that convergence of the Markov Chain has been achieved.
In this study we make 15,000 draws from the Gibbs sampler and discard the first 5,000 to remove the dependence on our starting values.
Data
To estimate the model we obtain monthly industry data on prices and quantities of fluid milk, Data on retail prices, farm prices, the quantity of milk used in fluid products, and population in each FMMO region are obtained from the online database maintained by USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. The database reports the monthly average retail prices of whole milk in gallons in the largest and second largest food store chains and the largest convenience store chain for 36 cities. We construct the retail price of fluid milk in each region by assigning each city to an FMMO region and taking the simple average across the three types of stores and across cities in a region. We convert the retail price to $/lb. assuming one gallon of milk weighs Results Table 2 reports posterior means and standard deviations for the directly-estimated model parameters. The co-operative price coefficient in three-equation models is the estimated processorretailer mark-up. The estimated co-operative mark-up is the class 1 price coefficient reported in all models. The results show that the estimates of both processors-retailer and co-operative mark-ups are robust across models. We report the Bayesian Information Criteria, BIC, to determine which of the models best fits the data. 9 Between both the three-equation and the two-equation models the log-linear versions are preferred by the data.
To make inference on market power we turn to posterior means and standard deviations of demand elasticities and conduct parameters, reported in The small estimates of the conduct parameters themselves indicate little market power.
Posterior means of the processor-retailer conduct parameters are all less than 0.01 (a value consistent with a 100-firm, symmetric oligopoly), however all the estimates have mass around zero. As mentioned in the model section this result can be driven by the limitation of the threeequation models that impose FMMO regions as the geographic boundary for the processorretailer market. Contrary to these results, previous studies that analyzed only retailers' market power in fluid milk markets with smaller geographic boundaries found significant evidence that retailers' pricing behaviour is not competitive (i.e. Carman and Sexton, 2005; Chidmi et al. 2005 ).
On the other hand, posterior means of the co-operative conduct parameters are larger and estimated more precisely. We find that nine of the estimates of co-operative market power have mass away from zero. However, in only four marketing order regions (Florida, Pacific Northwest, Southwest, and Arizona-Las Vegas) do we find a conduct parameter greater than 0.01. Our findings of small conduct parameters are consistent with findings from previous applications to the NEIO framework to farm commodity markets (see Sexton, 2000 for a review).
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However, recalling that the mark-up at each stage of production is expressed as (1 + λ i η i ) −1 , i = {retail, co − op}, note that mark-up at each stage of production is determined not by the conduct parameter alone but by the conduct parameter relative to the elasticity of demand, or the Lerner index. For a given conduct parameter, the resulting mark-up and the wealth transfer associated with it are decreasing in the absolute value of the elasticity of demand; mark-ups will be larger where demand is more inelastic ceteris paribus. In the case of U.S. fluid milk markets, the fact that demand is so inelastic means that even an apparently small conduct parameter could generate a large mark-up and an economically significant wealth transfer.
We estimate the mark-ups to be 1.0041 (s.d. 0.0040) for milk processors-retailers and 1.0879 (s.d. 0.0017) for co-operatives (table 2) . That is, given the elasticity of retail demand combined processors-retailers are able to use their market power to raise retail price by approximately 0.4% over marginal cost; given the elasticity of derived demand for milk co-operatives are able to use their market power to raise the price of milk purchased by fluid milk plants by approximately 9% over the minimum price enforced by FMMOs.
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To quantify the key welfare implications at each draw we calculate the income transfers that result from market power by processors-retailers and by co-operatives in fluid milk markets regulated by FMMOs. 12 The income transferred from milk buyers to co-operatives as a result of co-operative market power is equal to the product of the estimated co-operative mark-up and the quantity of Class 1 milk. Similarly, the income transferred from final milk consumers to processor-retailers as a result of processor-retailer market power is the product of the estimated retail mark-up and the quantity of Class 1 milk. We report posterior mean and standard deviation of welfare implications for each FMMO region and for all FMMO regions in table 4.
The key findings are that the estimated annual income transfer to co-operatives is approximately $636 million with a mass away from zero, and the estimated annual income transfer to processorretailers is approximately $73 million with a mass around zero.
Conclusion
Concentration in milk marketing, processing, and retailing in the United States has created potential for firms in the milk supply chain to exercise market power. In the case of marketing of farm milk, market structure is influenced by two aspects of federal policy: the Capper-Volstead
Act that grants farmer co-operatives partial exemption from antitrust laws, and FMMO regulations that effectively prevent fluid milk plants from exercising market power in their input market. We derive a structural model of the supply chain for beverage milk in order to estimate oligopoly power in sequential stages of production.
In our application to fluid milk markets in the U.S., we make use of Federal Milk Marketing Order regulations that determine the geographic extent of markets and enforce minimum prices that determine co-operatives' marginal opportunity cost. A key finding is that while the estimated conduct parameter for dairy co-operatives is small (e.g., 0.0027 for the Northeast region), the fact that the derived demand for milk facing co-operatives is very inelastic allows co-operatives to exact mark-ups of approximately 9%. The resulting estimate of annual income transfer from milk buyers to dairy farmers, in the regions subject to FMMO regulations, is approximately $636 million with a mass away from zero. Retail demand for fluid milk is also quite inelastic, but the estimated conduct parameter for processors-retailers is relatively small such that the retail mark-up is less than one percent. The resulting estimate of annual income transfer from final milk consumers to processor-retailers is approximately $73 million with a mass around zero.
Notes
1 Under perfectly elastic supply the only exception to processors' price taking behavior can be made if cooperatives were able to perfectly price discriminate so that they were making use of an all-or-nothing demand curve. In this case the price can be determined via a bargaining game between the height of the all-or-nothing demand and the perfectly elastic supply. However, to our knowledge there is no evidence to cooperatives perfectly price discriminating behavior. Furthermore, we observe that cooperatives announce only a single price every month.
2 Transactions between milk processors and retailers are potentially interesting and important. However we are not able to investigate these interactions because a lack of data on wholesale milk prices.
3 The typical NEIO study assumes a linear or log-linear demand schedule which raises the usual concerns about the effects of functional form. Genovese and Mullin (1998) estimated a range of functional forms for demand in an application to the sugar refining industry, and found that their industry conduct parameter was insensitive to the assumed demand form.
4 The prior is non-informative in the sense that it effectively imposes only the inequality restrictions on slope parameters of demand and on mark-up parameters of pricing equations. 6 In this study we use the Co-operative Class 1 price as the transaction price for the fluid milk between co-operatives and processors. The announced Class 1 prices are the only public record that can be used for this purpose, and, to our knowledge, there is not an academic publication or any other public record to verify whether these prices are systematically higher or lower than the actual transaction prices paid to co-operatives.
However, from our informal discussions with several economists we understand that some economists believe over order payments include charges for the cost of services performed by co-operatives, and tend to be higher than actual transaction prices for fluid milk. We discuss the implications of this case in the following section.
7 We thank to an anonymous referee for pointing out the role of the Northeast Dairy Compact on Class 1 minimum prices.
8 We matched the demographics data from ACS with FMMO regions based on the county FIPS code. On occasions where a county falls within the boundaries of two FMMO regions we included the demographics data of the county in average calculations of both FMMO regions.
derive comparable BIC statistic for log-linear models as: BIC j = 2log|J|p(y|(ψ =ψ j )) − K j logN T , where |J| = ∂e ∂y (y|ψ) denotes the Jacobian of transformation. 10 As mentioned in footnote 4, in this study we interpret the announced Class 1 price as the transaction price for fluid milk between co-operatives and processors. If, however, the over order payments include unobservable co-operative costs associated with serving the fluid milk market, our estimates of co-operatives' mark-up and market power can be interpreted as upper limits. Note that this interpretation reinforces our finding that co-operative conduct parameters are small.
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The results that the co-operative's mark-up is almost 9%, that the co-operative market conduct parameters are small and estimated more precisely are the same in the less restrictive 2-Equation models.
12 It follows from our estimates of small conduct parameters that efficiency losses are small relative to wealth transfers, which Sexton (2000) also found to be the case for previous studies of market power in the food chain. Note: Quantities are the annual weighted averages for each region. Reported mark-ups are the dollar-equivalents of the estimated percentage mark-ups. For the processor-retailer mark-up we assume one gallon of milk weighs 8 pounds. Retailer Mark-up refers to the combined processor-retailer mark-up. Wealth Transfer to Co-operatives (Retailers) is the estimated co-operative (processor-retailer) mark-up times the annual quantity of Class 1 milk.
